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How is “public finance” organized in China? Is China’s public finance system different from that of other 
countries? Can we detect features which link today’s system to the past? 
 
Definition and concepts 
Public finance refers to more than annual state budgets and constitutional procedures. It includes foreign 
debt, state monopolies or monetary policies, all of which played a crucial role in China’s public finance 
during the last hundred years. A purely legislative definition obscures the fact that changes in public 
finance have contributed to the collapse of political regimes such as Imperial China (1911), Republican 
China (1927), and KMT-China (1945), as well engendered regime changes in 1949, 1961 and 1978. From a 
more comprehensive economic perspective public finance in China encompasses institutions, organizations 
and policies.  
 
The authority to tax. The right to tax can be invested in an emperor, a cabinet, a 
president, parliament or a political Party; it can be limited to a central government 
or supplemented by provincial and local tax authority. The power to tax can lie 
with informal power holders or social groups. In the last one hundred years or so, 
China experimented with all these forms of tax authority.  
Tax administration. There are two recognized forms of effective taxation. One is 
tax farming, i.e. the delegation of the power to tax, to local administrations, such 
as provinces, magistrates, social groups or individual middlemen. The other, 
dominant model is a national tax administration operating a unified tax code. Characteristically, in China these two systems have never been seen as mutually 
exclusive. Neither Imperial Edicts (1906), constitutional amendments (1913; 
1931) nor government regulations (1984) were successful in establishing one 
centralized tax authority. Instead China’s public finance system is characterized 
by fluctuations between the two systems at the national level, while at the local 
level co-existence prevailed.  
 
Monetary policy. While it has been known since Late Qing-dynasty that inflation needs to be controlled by 
linking (paper) money to gold or silver standards and asks the State to refinance itself through domestic 
(Public) Banks or capital markets,  several attempts to introduce a monetary as opposed to a fiscal policy 
failed. Inflation was and is responded to by regulation and administrative control. Whether in form of 
closing the opium trade as a means to stem the silver outflow in the middle of the 19
th century, compulsory 
sales of government bonds in the middle of the 1930s, indiscriminately ordering budget cuts at the end of 
the 1990s or recently price control, regulations takes precedence over monetary policy which asks to 




Imperial China. These three features suggest that China’s public finance system  
has always known strong formal and informal elements and state interference. 
Arguably, the Western-inspired, formal constitutional phase in Public Finance 
started with an Imperial Edict of November 6
th, 1906 when the Court in order to 
stem the financial anarchy into which China has fallen since the Opium Wars 
acknowledged that the traditional way of public accounting was unable to cope 
with war expenditures, war indemnities and rapidly increasing imports. The 1906 Edict concentrated on reforms in tax administration rather than searching for new 
revenue sources and failed to institute ministerial responsibility for a Board of 
Finance, functional instead of the inherited Ming-dynasty territorial divisions and, 
bank control in loan management.  
 
Republican China. Before the Imperial reforms could have been tested China 
politically disintegrated. Nationalist Party cliques in different political and military 
alliances represented “national” governments which seldom controlled more than 
the vicinity of their respective capitals in Beijing, Nanjing or Chongqing. Different 
constitutions (1913, 1931) or programs aimed at reforming public finance 
remained futile exercises. What characterized the period between 1911 and 1949 
is that (1) the size of  the jurisdiction where public finance management was 
possible depended on alliances between different political forces, for example, 
the size of the Red Army or Warlord controlled territories and eventually 
Japanese occupied territories; (2) the self-styled national governments were 
unable to tax agriculture, leaving only the narrow base of the nascent urban 
sector as revenue source as no national government had control over collecting 
revenues from regional or local semi-autonomous interest groups; (3) 
intergovernmental transfers were in fact not regular fiscal transfers, but money 
flows in return for political support or war expenditure.  
 
 Socialist China. A socialist system of public finance is primarily characterized by 
de-monetization of the economy. Flows of goods, services, income, investment, 
let alone profit follow a united, consolidated plan, which relies on (physical) 
quantities rather than monetary value. When all assets are under central or local 
state control, most (corporate) tax obligations are replaced by (profit) transfer as 
the dominant revenue source. Such profit transfer, for example, contributed 51 
per cent of total cenrtral state revenue in 1978. Between 1949 and 1983 taxes 
were limited to three kinds: tax on industrial production and commerce, 
agriculture tax and tariffs. In a de-monetized Planned Economy inflation is side-
stepped at the cost of waiting lists or queues emerging  when demand for goods 
or capital does not meet appropriate (real) supply. In monetary terms, the volume 
of public finance in the PRC indicates a small size of government because the 
huge and increasing outlays for social security that characterize market 
economies are missing. However, in real terms the scope of government 
activities is maximized as the the state-owned corporate sector takes on public 
finance responsibilities.   
 
Reform China. The challenge for Reform China has been to design a new public 
finance system able to mobilize resources from the growing non-state sector of 
the economy, such a private firms and individuals, and new sectors (e.g. modern 
service industries such as IT and marketing), while ensuring at the same time 
that the habitually heavy hand of the state did not hinder new market-conforming 
organizations and innovation to emerge. Traumatized by inflation and the debt crisis in the 20
th century, China’s leaders in contrast to other transition 
economies, pursued strict anti-inflationary policy, and a foreign trade policy which 
facilitates the hoarding for foreign exchange. Domestic reforms first turned state-
owned companies and later collective and private enterprises into taxpayers, 
following the examples set by Chinese-foreign joint venture firms which led the 
way to incorporation from the mid 1990s.  Corporate income tax was first 
introduced for foreign joint ventures yet, since 2005 is applied to all corporations 
irrespective of ownership. In order to streamline the numerous taxes on specific 
goods most of which being levied by local government agencies, a value added 
tax (VAT) with a unified rate was introduced in 1994.  
 
The most striking feature of the public finance system however is China’s specific 
form of Fiscal Federalism which has two parallel tax systems, namely the 
national tax administration in charge of standardized national taxes and tax 
sharing contracts, and the independent local tax system at provincial level and 
below which controls its own tax base. Tax sharing has two meanings here. One 
refers to tax sharing contracts between central and local governments. The other 
refers to revenue from specific taxes raised by these two tax agencies, which is 
split between central and provincial level according to specified formulas. Thus, 
public finance becomes a problem of central-local politics where the centre 
(Beijing) transfers regulatory power to the local state as an incentive to promote 
local economic growth. Initially, in the 1980s, local governments more than 
Beijing had benefited from local economic development. Since then the central government has redressed the financial balance by introducing the VAT of which 
70 per cent revert to the centre and by banning surtaxes and local levies, and by 
generally strengthening changing the sharing local and central tax administration. 
Though the reforms improved the revenue appropriation for the central 
government, their overall effect is limited. China is still or once more operating 
with the coexistence of a modified version of tax farming and a national tax 
administration that does not reach to the lowest local level.   
 
  
   HISTORICAL CONTINUITIES 
 
From an economic perspective, public finance in China appears as a “hybrid” 
between a constitutional form of public finance and features that can be linked to 
China’s Socialist past, if not Republican and Imperial, institutional heritage. If 
there is a path dependency that underlies its economic dynamism, this 
institutional continuity would be unique and with a rationality of its own. Three 
features are “Chinese” in the sense that they can be found in the different 
political regimes that have been tried out in the last some 100 years in China; at 
the same time they are features one would not find in other public finance 
systems worldwide today.  
 
•  Financial indifference toward “monetary” matters 





Financial indifference toward “monetary” matters 
 
Those who wonder today why the political leadership in Reform China does not 
see reasons, let alone any urgency to allow private banking, and subsequently a  
domestic capital market to emerge, are reminded of a similar indifference of 
Imperial China and Republican China in the face of competition from the Non-
Chinese commercial banks in Shanghai. Without private modern banks 
absorbing household deposits and firms borrowing investment funds, China 
never developed a functioning capital market able to calculate the price of capital 
by letting interest rates reflect scarcity of capital required by different users of 
capital. Today as in the past, private lending and borrowing predominantly 
depends on informal banking, networking or allocation of financial means by 
state agencies. The disjuncture between capital market and monetary policy on 
one hand and public finance and financial policy on the other can be illustrated 
by some examples.  
 
(1) As national and local deficits are not bank-managed but remain state-
controlled, the absorptive capacity of the domestic capital market was and is not seriously tested. Instead, when debt cannot be served from expected (tax) 
revenue or when current budget deficits need to be (re-)financed, the state forces 
compulsory loans on economic agents (individuals and firms) which are designed 
to serve budgetary purposes, i.e. low debt service and too low annuity. 
(2) Regardless of whether China is a major debtor as in the past or a major 
lender of international liquidity and capital as today, foreign reserve and 
exchange rates are seen as a part of international politics. While in the past when 
China was burdened with large international debt, loans from donor countries 
were judged as a proof for the willingness of countries to support China as an ally 
in the 1930s and 1940s, or as a comrade in arms in the 1950. Today China uses 
its foreign reserves for state investment in countries of her choice, following 
international strategic rather than domestic economic considerations. 
(3) The sensitivity concerning China’s external financial position is in striking 
contrast to the indifference Chinese governments displayed towards domestic 
monetary matters. Thus, for example, the Qing Dynasty never made use of 
seignorage by raising revenue from the difference between the face value of 
coins and the real production and distribution costs, which was a major source of 
revenue for other large states. The Qing’s  use of a bimetallic silver-copper 
standard meant that the tael as a weight of metal rather than a standardized 
measurement for relative prices, it could not be used to fund investment. When 
foreign exchange reserve based (paper) money replaced the tael in 1933 
issuance was privatized, thus contributing to  hyperinflation hindering rather than 
facilitating the emergence of a domestic capital market. China, outside the foreign bank sector in Shanghai, has never had investment banks, let alone a 
corporate capital market. Socialist China would not change this picture being 
even more determined than other Socialist Economies to dismiss notions of 
money and capital. This might account for the fact that after 1978, reforms of the 
banking sector started much later than the reforms in other sectors and only 
gained pace when WTO-regulation and increasing international integration made 
partial liberalization of the banking sector and capital market inevitable.  
(4) The response of all different regimes to a monetary and financial crisis or a 
mix of both has always been to ask for administrative reforms and administrative 
interference. Each new political regime asked for more centralization of state 
power, and better and more honest administrators.  
In other words, the Chinese state has traditionally kept a financial distance to the 
commercial sector and allowed informal structures to persist rather than to 
enforce formal structures that would require strong state control down to the 
enterprise level.    
 
Ambivalence in Central-local relations 
 
The question how to govern an empire from one political centre accompanies all 
political regimes. History shows experiments with different degrees of 
decentralization follow political functional (transaction cost) and power, i.e. the 
need to compromise with local power holders’ considerations: Usually a political 
centre transfers regulatory power to territorial jurisdictions (kingdom, province, states) in return for political support (and peace) and stable revenues. China has 
specific modes.  
 
Modes of governance.   
Traditionally, China has employed two modes of fiscal governance characterized by distinctive 
administrative devices and different personnel, namely centralized  tax administration and decentralized tax 
farming. While in the socialist era, a centralized state bureaucracy prevailed, China revived tax farming in 
the 1980s and introduced a widespread (tax) sharing system in the 1990s. Thus, today’s China distinguishes 
between national tax (guojia shui) managed by a centrally appointed state bureaucracy operating unified 
tax codes, and local tax (difang shui) connected to the national tax bureaus via provincial level tax 
contracts. Within the local tax administration, tax contracts are also used between local tax administrators 
and individual firms. The contracts define the total tax obligation which is then allocated to different tax 
bases.   
 
Fiscal Federalism. Institutional change in the Public finance system in Reform China does not mean the 
introduction of a Fiscal Federalist System, in the same sense that the Ming dynasty’s fiscal administration 
following provincial borders has not been a Federalist System. As in the past, China’s form of Fiscal 
Federalism refers to decentralization of regulatory power, and negotiated revenue sharing within an unitary 
regime, rather than a constitution-based separation of power and allocation of tasks to different 
representative governments. 
  
The missing link at the grass root level. Closely linked to the problem of competing tax administrations and 
revenue sharing is the third feature, namely indifference toward or even the failure to build up a (tax) 
bureaucracy below the county level. Traditionally, the reach of the central state extended down to the 
county level. The question is whether the different regimes did not want to penetrate the Chinese economy 
further, as for example the Qing-dynasty which originally as an occupying force expected the domestic 
(Han)-magistrates to transfer revenues to the central (Manchu) coffer. In this case the boundary between 
tax farming and tribute payment is blurred. Another example is Nationalist China where shaky alliances with local warlords left local tax authority, in particular the right to raise land tax, in the hands of those who 
actually controlled the land. The most serious attempt to extend the reach of the state into the country side 
was made during the Great Leap Forward with the establishment of People’s Communes as basic economic 
units. This attempt was abandoned in the early 1960s.   
The indifference is reflected in today’s financial constitution which differentiates only between national 
and local taxes without specifying which sub-provincial level executes which kind of tax authority. It is 
rather up to the province how to further decentralize regulatory power.  
 
Central indifference toward local funding 
 
Central indifference with respect to local funding is a consequence of financial indifference in the sense 
that without the necessary fiscal and banking infrastructure, the financial reach of the central state remains 
weak, including its ability to regularize vertical transfers.  As a result the localities provide both the 
infrastructure and financial control. Whether driven by the need to find revenue sources independent from 
transfers from the national government, or motivated by an entrepreneurial spirit to increase local resources 
and income, local government agencies whether magistrates or township governments have always relied 
on alternative revenue sources a great part of which are still or once again in use today.  
 
Surtaxes and customary fees. One of the most striking features in Reform China’s public finance system are 
the so-called Extra-budgetary Revenues (EBRs) and Off-budgetary Revenues (OBRs), sources for local 
governments unknown outside China,  yet dating back centuries in China’s history. The EBRs, also used 
during the Socialist (and Republican-era) refer to surtaxes on production, income, cash flow of state 
controlled enterprises, and usage of local infrastructure. The latter refer to “voluntary” contributions by 
individuals or the local business community, i.e. gifts for special purposes. Today as in the case of, for 
example the notorious “meltage fee” (a surtax legitimized by the inevitable loss of silver when tax silver 
was melted into the ingots for transport) of the Ming- and Qing-dynasty, the discussion is dominated by 
two issues. In the economic controversy views are divided on whether the surtax (EBR) system threatens 
economic stability and the functioning of the central government, or whether surtaxes set incentives for local entrepreneurship and tax competition, and by doing so contribute to overall economic development. 
In the political debate views are divided between those who see the EBR/OBR system as the core for a new 
local state corporatism where the central  state has relinquished its hold on local economic development 
and those who see the risk of corruption as local economies become uncontrollable. The point to stress here 
is that the ambivalence with which the political leadership reacts to the consequences of such a system is 
not new. Today as in the past the different political regimes seem to shy away from either introducing a 
“hard” federalist system, in which political tasks and revenue sources are allocated to specific layers of 
government (and assessed by a vote) or a national tax system based on a unified tax code implemented by a 
national tax bureaucracy. As the recent tax reforms in 1994 and 2004 showed the central government tries 
to move into the direction of the latter by reducing the scope of EBR and OBR. The fact that local 
government agencies can informally levy surtaxes or fees so long as superior Party organization consent, 
gives these sources a ”semi-legal” status which differentiates them from corruption, even though the border 
line can be thin in such a highly informal environment.  
 
Informal networks for funding.  Surtaxes are not the only way by which local government agencies 
supplement revenues. As poor counties and villages in the past and present know their normal functioning 
can crucially depend on co-operation with or co-optation of the “gentry”, such as land-owners, merchants 
in the past and private owners of companies or foreign firms today. 
  
This is in contrast to rich villages where today co-operation with the local business community can make 
local governments rich despite shrinking direct control of resources. In other words, what further 
characterizes China’s public finance system at the local level is its reliance on informal networks for 
securing a sufficient resource if not a prospering tax base.  
 
(1)  One such source are local banks which are neither sub-branches of state banks nor “private” 
companies. As in the past these banks do not need to follow “sound” business practices, since the scope of 
business depends less on private savings than on financial transfer from superior bureaucracies and the cash 
flow companies are forced to keep in these banks. In most cases the banks today represent a kind of joint venture between the successors of the old merchants, i.e. the new local business community and local 
government agencies. These informal financial intermediaries provide the local state not only with cash but 
also with “venture capital” access to which as in the past depends on networking and negotiation. 
 
(2) Another revenue source is minority shares local government agencies keep in commercial companies. 
These shares do not merely indicate a yet not finished privatization of the local industrial sector. Instead, 
often enough local government agencies, if not individual bureaucrats, are invited to become co-owners in 
return for patronage and bureaucratic support. In other words, while government officials assume some 
entrepreneurial roles on behalf of their local companies, usually in regard to interactions with higher level 
bureaucracies, the local business community reciprocates by contributing to the local economy and local 
welfare - just as in the past. 
 
(3) By far the most crucial source of funding in the past ten years, however, has been land which is 
controlled by local government agencies or in rural areas by villages. There are documented cases where in 
townships and villages in the richer areas in South-East China profits from land and real estate deals can 
add up to sixty per cent of total revenue to the effect that the local government agencies become 
independent from the provincial or central money purse. Land ownership and lease contracts have re-
appeared on the political agenda in China, with the difference that today peasants face a “corporate” 
landlord in form of local government agencies in co-operation with development firms.  The central 
government’s policy is tighten  regulation, but even this is reminiscent of past experience where lack of 
enforcement makes this a strategy to fight off protest and unrest rather than an outright ban of local 
government business activity.   
 
All in all, at the local level, the system of informal funding leads to special, highly individual tax contracts 
in which the local governments negotiate overall tax obligations with firms and augment their formal 
revenue through informal business activities which, though officially not approved or even forbidden, are 
tolerated in the interest of local economic development. Parallel to these highly informal structures operates 
the national tax system which is developing towards the direction of “modern” taxation as used in developed economies. The national, ‘rational’ tax system is constantly exerting pressure on the informal 
system, which keeps local finance in a constant state of flux. .While this is not in conformity with 
constitutional rule, it provides relative stability across an economy with vast geographical, institutional and 





The argument that the reform of China’s public finance will only be complete once China has fully 
implemented a constitution-based institutional structure and corresponding organizations reflects the 
dominant view among economic analysts and the advice of multinational organizations. Yet, the factual 
coexistence of this merging formal system with local, informal structures is undisputed. From an 
institutional perspective, the informal-local features outlined above are not just remnants of the Socialist 
past, but have antecedents in China’s Imperial and short Republican history that make them part of China’s 
institutional infrastructure and organizational tradition.  These informal structures have enabled China to 
initiate and sustain economic growth in the absence of formal, legal structures, property rights and 
constitutional governance. While there is no doubt that these structures are changing, the questions is what 
lasting impact will they have on China’s emerging public finance system. The most likely scenario is that 
the impact of the globalization process that drives reform in China in the direction of increasing 
professionalization will continue to be counterbalanced by the traditional politicization of central-local 
relations.   
 
The professionalization in public finance. A clear break with the past is the fact that fiscal policy replaced 
regulation, direct resource or price control and state planning as major tool for implementing economic 
policy. Taxation, i.e. monetary (dis-)incentives for stimulating or discouraging certain economic activities, 
came under central control. With the consolidation of the VAT and the abolishment of surtaxes in the 
national tax codes, indirect taxation became the dominant revenue source for redistributive purposes. In 
contrast direct taxes (income and corporate tax) are used for development policy: While the tax base and rates encourage saving and capital accumulation, national and local tax privileges such as tax exemptions 
or different tax rates are used for stimulating foreign and increasingly domestic investment of certain 
industries, in particular the IT And High Tech sectors in special economic zones. Though this change has 
become effective predominantly in the national tax administration, a professional and streamlined tax 
administration is filtering down to local tax administrations. China today follows the notion of effective tax 
policy as do other developed economies. 
 
The politicization of central-local relations. While one part of the inherited state bureaucracy is making the 
transition towards a professionalized fiscal policy acting as an agent of the central government, the other 
part retains a political role by lobbying for and representing local interests. Local government agencies 
acting as agents for local business interests, including capital, land and labor, continue to shift  the process 
of central-local relations and revenue sharing  towards a debate about policy making and expenditure best 
suited to serve local economic development.  
Overall, state expenditure is determined in a semi-public negotiation process between the private sector, 
local governments and the political centre. While the central government sets guidelines for labor 
conditions, health care, pensions, education, privatization of public utilities, implementation depends on 
political negotiations between different levels of the political hierarchy. In this context, central-local 
relations need not be seen as part of a traditional bureaucratic procedures but as the closest equivalent to a 
representation of public interests that is possible in a closed and centralized political system., The economic 
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